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Abstract 
In an effort to promote the free movement of people and capital, and to establish a 
supranational conception of identity that deemphasizes nationality and ethnicity as markers of 
difference, the European Union (EU) has pursued a specific policy agenda of “deterritorializing” 
its internal borders. Utilizing the urban area of Frankfurt an-der-Oder, Germany, and Słubice, 
Poland--two border cities divided only by the Oder River--as an ethnographic site, this paper 
examines the construction and performance of national and ethnic identities in the transnational 
context of the Polish-German border regions through the commonplace cultural interactions 
engendered by the deregulation of cross-border movements and consumption practices.  By 
examining the everyday articulation and negotiation between different ethnicities and 
nationalities, this paper explores how residents of the Polish/German border regions employ 
different forms of ethnic, national and transnational identities, and how systems of ethnicity and 
nationality are reconfigured in response to the EU's expanding transnational institutions.  In this 
way, Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice acts as a microcosm for demonstrating transformations that are 
occurring throughout Europe, by virtue of its location as a place where what it means to be 
“European” is negotiated and contested through everyday cross-border practices and interactions. 
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Bridging the Divide? 
Ethnic Identity and Transnational Consumption in a “European City” 
 
Introduction 
The border crossing between Frankfurt an-der-Oder
1, Germany and Słubice, Poland 
begins at the corner of Karl-Marx-Straße and Rosa-Luxemburg-Straße.  After passing a 
McDonald’s, a casino, and a line of taxis waiting for people arriving from Poland, an eastward 
traveler enters the border control checkpoint: cars and bicycles in the center, foot traffic on the 
outside.  At the checkpoint, everyone must present a passport or national identification card to 
both the German and Polish border police.  The queue is usually short, almost never more than 
five minutes.  For European Union (EU) citizens, this is an open border, and the check for them 
is usually cursory, amounting to only a glance through a passport or at an ID card.  For people 
are carrying non-EU, “third country” passports, the check is more stringent, and its rigor often 
depends on the traveler’s country of origin.  After exiting the border control, it is about a five-
minute walk over the bridge spanning the Oder River to the Polish side.  On the left side 
stretching parallel to the river, a line of taxis waits for people arriving from Germany.  They are 
cheaper if a passenger pays in Złoty instead of Euros, and the price can be negotiated in advance, 
but sometimes only in Polish.  On the right side, mini-buses take people to the local bazaar, a 
little less than two kilometers away.  After passing a white and red boundary marker (No. 490) 
bearing Poland’s crowned white eagle and crossing the street, the eastward traveler arrives at a 
pedestrian zone, ulica Jednosći Robotnicze (United Workers Street), or the “Zigaretten-Straße” 
                                                 
1  In local speech, Frankfurt an-der-Oder is usually referred to simply as “Frankfurt.”  When it is necessary to 
distinguish it from the much larger Frankfurt am Main, the abbreviation “Frankfurt(Oder)” is utilized.   For the 
purposes of clarity, I use Frankfurt(Oder) throughout the remainder of this paper. 
Comment [ADA1]:  Asher 
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(Cigarette Street) in local slang, and is greeted by beer gardens, alcohol and cigarette shops, hair 
salons, and money exchanges. 
Once one of the most tightly controlled borders in socialist Europe, the openness of 
today’s Polish-German border stands in stark contrast to the nearly impassable boundary 
remembered by one border resident as “...something uncanny. First, there was the barbed wire, 
and then the Grenzstreifen (the forbidden border-zone).  Every few minutes soldiers who 
guarded the border patrolled there” (Stokłosa 2003:356). Today, the Polish-German border is at 
the center of the European Union’s projects of “integration” and “deterritorialization” as it 
endeavors to promote and expand its common “European” market through the free movement of 
people, goods, services, and capital. 
Located about 80 kilometers east of Berlin, Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is a transnational 
urban area of just under 90,000 residents
2, and is situated at almost the exact midpoint of the 
Polish-German border.  Towns located on the international borders of the EU are regularly 
described as the “laboratories” of European integration because cross-border contact and 
interaction is more intensive in these regions.  As such, these cities are also locations where the 
EU has most vigorously pursued policies aimed at de-emphasizing national boundaries.  This 
processes of deterritorialization has entailed an increased emphasis on regional initiatives with 
the ultimate goal of creating what Martinez (1994) calls “integrated borderlands,” or border 
regions that have “no barriers to the flow of goods and people,” and “enjoy a relationship of 
equality, trust and respect” (Donnan & Wilson 1999:51). To this end, the EU has created cross-
border “Euroregions”
3 to help facilitate cultural and economic cooperation and integration 
 
2  Frankfurt(Oder)’s population in 2001 was 70,308, while Słubice’s population in 2000 was 17,737. 
3 Euroregions are cross-border regional institutions that the EU uses to assist in the administration of transnational 
regional funds and policies.  Euroregions are not official governing bodies, but are instead voluntary associations of Asher 
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between its member states, and has provided various regional funding initiatives (e.g. 
INTERREG and PHARE) aimed specifically at transnational and interregional cooperation.   In 
Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, these initiatives have funded cultural events, educational activities, 
infrastructure development, and economic investment, all of which endeavor to promote contact 
and interaction between and among Polish and German citizens living in the border regions. 
I experienced many of these projects firsthand while conducting five months of fieldwork 
in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice during the summers of 2003 and 2004. I attended concerts, festivals, 
and sporting events sponsored in part by the EU, and enjoyed parks and walking paths that EU 
funds helped build and refurbish. I taught classes at the cities’ cross-border university, Europa 
University Viadrina/Collegium Polonicum, in a building constructed with EU funds, and even 
lived in a students’ apartment complex built with an EU grant.  Indeed, the EU’s projects are 
almost ubiquitous in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice’s urban space.   
While living in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, I met a wide variety of individuals residing on 
both sides of the border, including not only Poles and Germans, but also non-EU “third country” 
citizens.  Working in some combination of German, Polish and English (as is often typical in the 
border regions), I conducted both structured interviews and informal conversations with residents 
of Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, but as is often the case with ethnographic research, many of my 
findings are based on participating in the everyday social life of the cities and circulating with its 
residents in the local, yet transnational space provided by its unique location.   
 
 
 
 
municipal and local governments that can generally be considered civil society institutions.  For a detailed 
discussion of the “Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina,” which includes Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, see Asher (2004). Asher 
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National Boundaries and “European” Spaces   
As places where one governing regime ends and another begins, border regions are 
locations where processes of governmentality are especially apparent.  Foucault describes 
governmentality as the “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of. . .[a] form of power, which has 
as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential 
technical means apparatuses of security” (1991:102).  In his discussion of governmentality, 
Foucault emphasizes the themes of security, territory, and population, each of which, as markers 
of the extremity of the state, borders have an important role in regulating (cf. Donnan and Wilson 
1999).  As locations where individuals encounter the direct regulation of movement and are 
subjected to state scrutiny and surveillance, borders are locations where the practices of 
governmentality are experienced personally and firsthand, while the institution of the border 
regime, with its associated policing and security apparatuses, acts as an extremely potent symbol 
of state power.   
By functioning to delineate populations and territories from one another, borders can be 
used as extremely strong markers of national or ethnic difference.  However, local cross-border 
economic, cultural, and even political ties can act to subvert this division, often pulling 
individuals away from close identification with their nation-state of residence, and producing 
ambiguous transnational identities (Donnan and Wilson 1999:60, cf. Strassaldo 1982).  By 
utilizing its supranational institutions and policies in an effort to encourage an overarching 
“European” identity that can encompass multiple ethnicities and nationalities, the EU is 
attempting to reconcile this ambiguity.  Simultaneously, by working to establish this 
transnational identity, the EU also helps advance its goal of further economic and political Asher 
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integration.  In their regulatory function, borders are a hindrance to both these processes, leading 
the EU to work toward reforming the practices of governmentality within its member states by 
creating a supranational ensemble of laws, regulations, policies, and institutions that supersede 
those of its member states
4 and are aimed at eliminating barriers to the free movement of people, 
goods, and capital.   
By pursuing policies that de-emphasize borders between nation-states, the EU endeavors 
to eliminate the function of borders as transforming, “territorial” passages, where one moves 
from the identity of a citizen to that of a foreigner (Berdahl 1999:4), and replace them with a 
fluid transnational space in which an EU citizen may move from country to country while 
remaining first and foremost a “European”.  The EU’s policies of opening borders have 
contributed significantly to the transformation of the Polish-German border from a tightly 
regulated and difficult to cross barrier, to one in which crossing over the bridge between Poland 
and Germany and through its border checkpoint is a regular (and sometimes daily) experience for 
many of Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice’s residents.  Although residents on both sides of the border can 
now circulate freely, the cities’ residents remain conscious of crossing between two separately 
constructed spaces.  As one of the dominant architectural features of the cities, the bridge is 
symbolic of both “European” connection and national separation
5. One local university student 
remarked that there should be a marker at the center of the bridge that indicates where one 
crosses “into the East.”  This student’s use of the metaphorical “East” acknowledges the deep 
historical and cultural divisions that were often also encompassed by the Polish-German border 
 
4 As a requirement of EU membership, member states must implement the EU’s entire body of laws and regulations, 
the aquis-communitare, and agree through treaty provisions that the requirements of the aquis-communitare 
supersede those of national law. 
5 According to a “mental map” survey of the urban area’s residents, the Oder bridge is the third most identified 
feature in the cities, behind only the river itself and the Oderturm, the cities’ only skyscraper (Garand 2002).  The 
symbolism of bridges as mediums of connection is also utilized by the Euro paper currency, with the back of each 
Euro note featuring an evolving architectural style of bridge on each successively higher denomination.   Asher 
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(cf. Wolff 1994).  Through forms of governmentality that promote cross-border integration and 
cooperation, the EU programs and policies have alleviated some of these divisions while 
aggregating others.   
Within the Polish-German border regions, the commonplace cultural interactions 
engendered by the deregulation of cross-border movements of people and goods create a context 
in which the everyday articulation of different ethnicities and nationalities provide residents of 
the border regions with multiple possibilities through which to express individual and collective 
identities.  These expressions of identity include both the ethnic and national identities of 
“German” or “Polish,” as well as an emerging and hybridized model of “European” identity that 
complicates and challenges the historical construction and maintenance of political and cultural 
boundaries between Poland and Germany. 
 “As a strategy of self-representation and a device of power,” the process of 
Europeanization “is fundamentally reorganizing territoriality and peoplehood, two principles of 
group identification that have shaped modern European order” (Borneman & Fowler 1997:487).  
As subjects living in a transnational space, residents of the Polish-German border regions 
demonstrate practices that challenge the idea of ethnically-defined national territories while 
simultaneously reinforcing and utilizing these territories as markers of difference.  In an effort to 
illuminate the dynamic and contested nature of the “European project,” this essay will examine 
how ethnic, national, and transnational identities are created, contested, and employed 
strategically during the practices of cross-border consumption and cultural production in 
Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice.  As an explicitly transnational location where the meanings of 
“European” are subjected to daily negotiation and contestation through commonplace cross-
border practices and interactions, the experiences of Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice’s residents are Asher 
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illustrative of transformations and accommodations that are occurring throughout Europe in the 
wake of the EU’s continued expansion of its powers and institutions.   
 
A Troubled History 
Within Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, the history of the Polish-German border regions 
profoundly influences the construction of ethnic and national identities, making it useful to give 
a brief account of 20
th century Polish-German relations here.  Since Poland regained 
independence in 1918, the Polish-German border has been almost continuously, and sometimes 
violently, contested, beginning with two border wars: the Posnanian War of December 27, 1918 
to June 28, 1919 and the Silesian War, which was fought sporadically during the summers of 
1919-1922 (Davies 1982:394).  On August 31, 1939, World War II began with a Nazi-staged 
attack by “Poles” on a radio station in the German border town of Gleiwitz (Gliwice), 
predicating the German invasion the next morning (Davies 1982:435).  In 1945, the Allied 
negotiations at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences redrew Poland’s post-war borders.  After the 
Soviet Union made clear its intention to annex the portions of Poland it had acquired in the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, Poland’s eastern border was moved to the Curzon line,
6 a loss of 
territory that was offset by moving Poland’s western border at the Oder and Neiße rivers. 
As a result of this westward territorial shift, about 1.5 million ethnic Poles were 
compelled to move west from behind the new Soviet-Polish frontier, while as many as 9 to 10 
million ethnic Germans were forced to emigrate from Poland’s “recovered” territories in the 
 
6 This line was proposed by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920 and 
the post World War I peace negotiations (Davies 1982:504).  It approximates the Nazi-Soviet demarcation line of 
1939. Asher 
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west
7 (deZayas 1979:58,89).  Around 4.5 million ethnic Poles were resettled in these 
“recovered” territories, principally from central Poland and the lands annexed by the Soviet 
Union, while about 1 million residents were allowed to stay, provided their Polish ethnicity could 
be verified (Gruchman, et al. 1959:136,144).  Słubice was “founded” by resettled Poles in 1945 
when the movement of the Polish-German border divided the eastern riverside quarter of 
Frankfurt(Oder), then called Dammvorstadt, from the rest of the city.
8  With the movement of 
the border, Słubice was transformed from an integral part of a regional center to a relatively 
isolated small town of only about 15,000 residents. Both the historical city center and the train 
station were located on the German side of the border.  The train connection to Słubice was only 
recently reestablished, and after leaving Frankfurt(Oder) most trains traveling east still bypass 
the city. It is often more convenient for Słubice’s residents to cross the border into 
Frankfurt(Oder) to get a train connection to cities in Poland.   
The contested nature of the Polish-German border contributed to post-World War II 
border regimes that reified difference, especially nationalized ethnic difference, as a way to 
consolidate and legitimize power over the new territorial arrangements (S. Anderson 2001, 
Schultz 2003).  With the exception of a brief period between 1972 and 1980, when the border 
was opened to limited cross-border traffic, it was extremely difficult if not impossible for 
average border residents to cross between Poland and Germany during the forty-five years from 
1946 to 1991, when the border was opened to visa-free traffic.  Schultz explains that Słubice 
explicitly constructed its identity in opposition to Frankfurt(Oder), explaining, “[Słubice] wanted 
never to share the urban history of Frankfurt(Oder).  Słubice as border guard of the Polish 
 
7  Due to the chaotic circumstances of this region at the end of World War II, the precise number of German 
expellees remains impossible to determine.  Another 3.5 million ethnic Germans, the “Sudeten Deutsch,” were 
forced to emigrate from Czechoslovakia. 
8 Słubice’s name derives from a Slavic settlement in the Middle Ages called Śliwice, which the Piasts lost to 
Brandenburg in 1250 along with the rest of the Lubuska region (Urząd Miejski w Słubicach 2003:5).    Asher 
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‘Regained Territories’ built up her own history, rooted in the pioneer period after the last world 
war” (2002:53). Because it was unclear if Germany would accept the new border, the border 
served a dual purpose, both to keep Poles in and Germans out—out of their former homes, cities 
and territories.  The ethnic opposition engendered by these cross-border oppositions further 
supported the strong ethno-nationalist identities that were already entrenched in Poland and 
Germany by the 19
th century (cf. Davies 1982, Porter 2000, Snyder 2003).   
While the post-war border was officially accepted by East Germany in 1950 by the 
Görlitz Treaty, only after West Germany and Poland signed the Warsaw Treaty in 1970, which 
normalized relations between the two countries, was permanent residence by the border regions’ 
Polish settlers relatively assured.  The subject was not put to rest until 1991, when Poland and 
Germany signed a border treaty and the Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship and 
Cooperation.  Nevertheless, the possibility that displaced Germans might file indemnity suits in 
Polish or European courts has not yet been completely ruled out, and in many ways the 
“recovered territories” remain a contested space.  For example, in 2004, a group of expelled 
Germans began civil indemnity proceedings against Poland to seek reparations for lost property, 
an action that sparked an intense debate in Poland’s legislature and eventually led to the Sejm 
(Poland’s lower house) passing a resolution (328 to 0, with one abstention) on September 10, 
2004 which denounced the claims as unlawful.   
One of the motivations for creating a mono-ethnic Polish state was to help establish a 
more lasting peace in Europe by removing potentially problematic ethnic minorities in the hope 
of finally solving the problem of overlapping ethnic settlement patterns in the Polish-German 
border regions.  This strategy was pursued throughout post-war Central and Eastern Europe.  In 
addition to Germans and Poles, populations of Czechs, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Belarusians, Asher 
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Ukrainians, and Magyars all experienced resettlement
9. Because of the reification of an ethnic 
definition of the nation-state, in the case of Poland and Germany, the politically expedient 
territorial shift arranged at Yalta and Potsdam required a subsequent population shift, resulting in 
a reorganization not only of both countries’ territorial compositions, but also the compositions 
and the geographic distributions of their populations.  With the movement of the Polish-German 
border, native-born residents in the “recovered territories” were instantaneously converted to 
“minorities” with potentially subversive tendencies, which then required, at least in the eyes of 
the policymakers, their resettlement for the sake of stability (deZayas 1979:10).  The forced 
emigration of Germans from Poland, and Poles from the Soviet Union, therefore stems from the 
same quest for stability that created the impetus for the integration projects that eventually led to 
the formation of the EU, a rather ironic situation as the EU now faces the very problems created 
by these policies fifty years ago.   
 
Pursuing “Europe” in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice 
Comaroff and Comaroff observe that “ethnicity has its origins in the asymmetric 
incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a single political economy” (1992:54).  
This description fits the relationship between Poland and Germany within EU almost perfectly, 
where Germany remains a considerably more powerful economic and political power than 
Poland.  For Poles and Germans living near the border, this asymmetry is very apparent in 
everyday experience, due to the high economic disparity that remains between the two sides.  
Dascher has calculated the real per capita GDP of the German border region as about four times 
 
9 For an excellent summary and cartographic representation of these population shifts see Magocsi (2002) Asher 
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that of the Polish border region (2003:11-14) even as both regions share endemic problems of 
high unemployment and economic malaise.   
A community with relatively easy cross-border access, Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is a site 
where “cultural confrontation, articulation. . .and penetration” create “struggles over the 
production of cultural meanings” in which ethnic and national identities are simultaneously  
constructed, employed and challenged (Berdahl 1999:9).  Barth asserts that the maintenance of 
ethnic identity is most meaningful at its boundaries, since this is the location where inter-ethnic 
interaction is highest (1969:15-16). Because of a history that has linked the nation-state to 
ethnicity, this is especially true in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice  where the extremely high level of 
ethnic homogeneity produced on both sides of the border (and in Poland and German 
generally)
10 after World War II have created a resilient ethnic border.    Within this context, it is 
common for individuals living in both Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice to use the generalized ethno-
national categories of “Poles” and “Germans,” as a heuristic shorthand with which to make 
comparative generalizations of perceived similarity and difference.  This is also precisely the 
differentiation that the EU wishes to de-emphasize.   
As a way to overcome these historical and ethno-national differences, in the Polish-
German border regions, the EU has focused much of its practices of supranational 
governmentality on transnational cultural policies aimed at promoting cross-border interaction 
and cooperation. In Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, local politicians have demonstrated a relatively 
high commitment this “European” project, and a significant segment of the politics in 
Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is caught up in negotiating these decisions.  As an example of this 
commitment, during the summer of 2003 the city administrations of Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice 
 
10 According the CIA World Factbook (2003), 97.6% of Polish citizens identify as ethnically Polish, and 91.5% of 
German citizens identify as ethnically German. Asher 
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undertook an ambitious project to promote integration between the cities through cross-border 
cultural tourism.  The “Europagarden 2003,” was a comprehensive urban renewal and cultural 
exchange project designed to enhance the cities’ riverfront, to build a common “green” city 
center, and to improve the aesthetic and recreational quality of the cities (Słubice Municipal 
Government 2003).  Funded by both EU regional funds (such as PHARE and INTERREG) and 
the municipal governments, the Europagarden can be considered both part of the EU’s 
integration strategy and demonstrates a local enactment of the utopian vision the EU promotes of 
an “integrated” borderless Europe.  
Lasting from May to October, the Europagarden 2003 implemented a multifaceted group 
of events, projects and festivals.  Most of the Europagarden’s cultural events took place on the 
Isle Ziegenwerder, a small island in the German side of the Oder River that was developed into a 
large park with several performance venues.  From June through August, every Thursday 
through Sunday featured an event showcasing Europe’s cultural and artistic diversity, including 
performances by musicians, films, theatre, fashion shows and art installations.   
Many of these events were targeted at demystifying the border, and promoting cross-
border contact.  One event I attended is illustrative of this goal.  Part of the “Jazz on the Oder” 
series, the evening opened with a Kabarett featuring Steffen Möller, a comedian who has lived in 
both Poland and Germany and whose performances present stories (using both German and 
Polish), about his experiences of cultural difference between Poland and Germany—an apt 
performer for the mixed Polish and German crowd from both sides of the border.  The Kabarett 
was followed by a jazz concert showcasing Polish trumpeter Tomasz Stańko and German pianist 
Joachim Kühn.  Both headliners in their own right, the performance of the Polish-German duo 
made a clear symbolic statement of support for Polish-German cooperation.       Asher 
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Other events were aimed at simply giving people a reason to cross the border and interact.  
For this purpose, two of the larger summer festivals, Johannisnacht (Summer Solstice, 21 July) 
and Oderfest (13-15 June) were held in Słubice.  Several of the Oderfest’s events concentrated 
on bringing people together through sporting competition, and included a boxing tournament, a 
tennis tournament, a chess tournament and a soccer tournament, in which residents of the two 
cities competed against one another and drew significant crowds of spectators.    
To contribute to the long-term recreational and aesthetic quality of 
Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, the Europagarden also built or refurbished nine parks—six in 
Frankfurt(Oder) and three in Słubice—and refinished the Słubice soccer stadium.  By striving to 
improve Słubice and Frankfurt(Oder) both aesthetically and socially, the Europagarden embodies 
the utopian vision of the cities as transnational, inter-ethnic, and “European,” by endeavoring to 
turn the two divided cities into a single integrated city that is a more “perfect” place to live.   
One of the Europagarden’s events, a twelve-day long series of art projects and seminars 
for local students, collectively called “Eden,” made the examination of the utopian ideal its 
central theme.  For example, one project, “Eden Schildern” (Eden Pictures), consisted of a series 
of photographs made by students, which were laminated and hung around the Isle Ziegenwerder 
on trees and lampposts.  The pictures were all taken in Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice, and the 
photographers were instructed to find the most beautiful thing in the ugliest area, or the ugliest 
thing in the most beautiful area.  A caption was then added, usually in Polish and German, which 
played with Paradise/Eden and border themes such as, “granice Ednu/die grenzen von Eden” 
(the borders of Eden), “Eden für jeden/Eden dla wszytkich” (Eden for everyone), and “wie 
kommt der Tod ins Paradies?/jak śmierć się dostaje do raju?” (How does death come to 
paradise?).  These themes are especially cogent for individuals experiencing the Polish/German Asher 
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border on a daily basis.  Not only do they underscore the difficulties of the border, such as 
multiple languages and cultural differences, they also observe that even in the transnational 
“paradise” of the EU old borders and differences persist.   
While relatively successful in many of its goals, the Europagarden was not an unqualified 
achievement.  Many residents complained that it was too expensive, with admission to most 
events costing between EUR 3 and EUR 12.  These prices caused many people to opt for other 
entertainment, or at least to think twice about attending.  In order to make up for the income 
disparity between Poland and Germany, there was a 50% discount in admission rates for Polish 
citizens, but this gesture may have been more derisive than helpful, as it inadvertently reinforced 
a subordinate status for Poles.  Other residents argued that the project itself was a waste of 
investment funds, and that the cultural events did not achieve any real goals.  Perhaps the largest 
problem for the Europagarden project was the cynical perception that it was organized 
principally as two separate projects which were then placed under one name to qualify for EU 
funding. 
    
Consumption, Hierarchy, and Travel in the “European City” 
  Given the EU’s emphasis on policies that promote an unrestricted market, it is perhaps 
not surprising that in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice shopping and the consumption of goods and 
services are two of the foremost reasons for crossing the border in either direction.  Shopping is a 
fundamental border activity (cf. Donnan and Wilson 1999, Thuen 1998, Wilson 1993, 1995), and 
according to a study by Schultz, it is by far the primary reason for cross-border trips by residents 
of border cities throughout Europe, but especially in Eastern Europe (2002:26). This ability to 
shop across the border was an advantage to living in the Polish-German border regions even Asher 
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during the socialist era, when hard to find items were sometimes available in one country but not 
the other (Dürrschmidt 2002:136).  These items often found their way across the border through 
personal networks even when it was closed to the general population. One Polish mother 
described the border as “indispensable” to her during the 1980s, when a personal connection 
with someone who was allowed to work in East Germany supplied her with powdered milk that 
was unavailable in Poland (Dürrschmidt 2002:136).  For many individuals living in 
Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, shopping is often the way they experience the border, and like Berdahl 
(1999) describes in her ethnography of the border between East and West Germany, the 
circulation of people and objects  intrinsic to the practices of shopping and consuming across a 
border provide important contexts for ascribing difference. Because the border between 
Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice is often perceived as an ethnic boundary, the distinctions and social 
relations demonstrated through shopping frequently acquire ethnic dimensions, while the 
commodities procured during this “ritual practice” are “used to constitute the complexity of 
contemporary social relations” (Miller 1998:8).       
During my interviews and conversations in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, shopping was a 
subject of tremendous discussion and debate, especially with regard to relative prices and the 
best places to buy particular items. Some items are demonstrably cheaper or easier to obtain on 
one side of the border.  For example, gasoline is about 20% cheaper on the Polish side, leading to 
long queues for automobiles at the border, especially on weekends and holidays.  Cigarettes are 
also cheaper on the Polish side, as are many grocery items, such as produce--most notably 
strawberries and asparagus--and baked goods.  Cosmetics are often cheaper on the German side, 
while service products such as dentists, hair and beauty salons, restaurants, and “nightclubs” 
featuring dancers and often prostitution, are almost always cheaper, and thus in greater Asher 
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abundance on the Polish side.  The daily exchange rate further influences purchasing choices, 
and the carrying of two currencies is commonplace (and often a necessity), leading to a 
prevalence of currency exchanges (kantor), especially on the Polish side.  Because Poland is not 
projected to adopt the Euro until at least 2007,
11 this division of currency is also an indicator of 
difference, demonstrating in symbolic terms that Poland is not quite ready to join the unified 
“Europe” represented by the common currency.   
In addition to price, the quality and selection of goods are constantly debated.  Seeking 
bargains is one principal reason for crossing the border, and visiting the Polish bazaar to search 
for cheap prices on a wide variety of items ranging from breads, meats, and cheeses, to bootleg 
CDs and DVDs, to fake designer jeans, is a popular activity for many Germans.  Trips between 
the bridge and the bazaar (a distance of about 1.5 kilometers) are a significant source of revenue 
for Słubice’s oversized taxi service, a lobby that has reportedly blocked all attempts at creating a 
unified public transit system between the towns.
12  The best place to purchase alcohol also varies 
by the type and quality that is sought.  Vodka is usually cheaper on the Polish side, while other 
EU-produced spirits are often less expensive or easier to find on the German side.  The 
consumption of beer, a product that is strongly linked to local identity in both Germany and 
Poland (cf. Asher 2003), is also divided by the border.  Polish beer is cheaper and almost 
exclusively served in Poland, while German beer is cheaper and almost exclusively served in 
Germany (although both types are available in both countries).   
The practices of cross-border consumption in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice facilitate not only 
the construction and maintenance of national, ethnic, and class differences between border 
 
11 This is the earliest date that Poland is projected to fulfill the debt to GDP ratio, interest rate, and inflation 
requirements of the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact that will allow it to participate in the third and final stage of the 
economic and monetary union (EMU), at which time the Euro currency is adopted for general use. 
12 Other Polish-German border cities, such as Görlitz-Zgorzelec, have successfully implemented integrated public 
transportation systems.   Asher 
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residents, but help to organize these differences into hierarchies of political and cultural value 
(Appaduri 1986, Berdahl 1999, Bourdieu 1984[1979], Howes 1996).  I was repeatedly told that 
clerks in German stores often discriminate against Poles by following shoppers through the aisles 
and treating them as potential thieves.  Marek
13, a Pole who works in Słubice internet café, 
described his experience: “Germans don’t like Poles.  They don’t look happy to see me when I 
go to McDonald’s.
14  In shops they look at you like a thief.”  While many Germans reportedly 
condescend to Poles in Germany, many Poles simultaneously judge some German consumers in 
Poland as morally degenerate and occupying low social status, saying that the Germans who go 
to the bars and nightclubs in Poland are too poor to afford the German versions, and only travel 
to Poland so that they can afford to indulge.   
Nevertheless, the provision of inexpensive domestic services (cooking, cleaning, haircuts, 
prostitution) by Poles reinforces a perception of German superiority, as well as the status of 
Poles as second class Europeans—the hired help in the “House of Europe.”  Or, as Bunzl argues 
of cross-border Austrian sex tourism in Prague, these practices produce fields and discourses of 
stratified neocolonial hierarchies between colonizing and colonized subjects (2000:89).  In 
Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice this neocolonial hierarchy is expressed by the process of mapping the 
producers of services as Polish and their consumers as German.  It is the EU, and its emphasis on 
the open market, that has created a transnational, cross-border space in which the consumption of 
services is possible, and has enabled the development of these hierarchies.  One wry Polish joke 
perhaps sums up many Poles’ view of their positioning in the EU best of all: “Once Poland joins 
the EU every Pole will have a Mercedes. . .to wash.”   
 
13  In the interest of confidentiality, all names are pseudonyms. 
14 The only McDonald’s in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is on the German side of the border. Asher 
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Although Poland’s accession to the EU on May 1, 2004 has largely deregulated cross-
border trade and purchases (and even before this date individuals were rarely asked to declare 
purchased goods at the border checkpoint),
15 price differentials and the remaining border 
controls between Poland and Germany make the smuggling of goods and people by organized 
crime a lucrative business and a significant problem.  The residents of Słubice consistently allude 
to this specter of mafia activity, and several of my respondents would regularly identify people 
they perceived as “Mafiosi” as we drank at sidewalk cafés in the evening.  I was also informed 
that one Polish hotel near the river was operated by the “Bulgarian” mafia, who financed 
themselves with stolen cars (from Germany).  Pawel, a Słubice resident who works in the 
university’s administrative offices, told me that the best ways to make money in Słubice are to 
smuggle cigarettes or alcohol, to run a nightclub (i.e. prostitutes), or to be a kantor (who are 
perceived as having questionable business practices).  He continued, saying, “these are the 
people who build the nice houses here.”  While it is unclear if organized crime is actually higher 
in Słubice than Frankfurt(Oder), the link between Poles, Poland, and crime acts to orient (and 
orientalize) Poland as not quite as “civilized” as Germany or the EU.  A common joke, told on 
both sides of the border in different circumstances and to different effect, demonstrates this 
positioning: “What is the slogan of the Polish tourism office in Germany? Come to Poland, your 
car has already arrived.”   
Along with organized crime, the perceived threat of violence is a constant presence along 
the border.  In 1991, after the border opened to visaless traffic, the first buses to cross the bridge 
from Poland were hit by stones in Frankfurt(Oder), an event that is commonly recalled in Poland 
as an example of German racism and discrimination.  Muggings and assaults are also cited as a 
 
15 As personal example of the “openness” of the border, I offer a brief illustration: one afternoon when I was 
crossing between Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice and back, I purchased a carton of cigarettes in Poland as a favor for a 
friend’s roommate—-an officer in the German border police. Asher 
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fear, and friends on both sides of the border perpetually warned me of the dangers I could face, 
especially when in Poland.  I personally knew one German who was beaten-up in Słubice, 
supposedly for fraternizing with Polish girls, and I was told about several “friends of friends” 
who were robbed on the street in Słubice.  While most of these stories are unverifiable, and many 
are certainly of questionable reliability, the fact they are in constant circulation is significant, as 
it ethnically maps Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice’s social space in a way that marks Poles and Słubice 
as less civilized and less safe than Germany and Frankfurt(Oder).  Similar to the link between 
colonial hierarchy and ethnic mapping observed by Kelleher (2003) in the borderlands between 
Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, the ethnic mapping of Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice 
again demonstrates a construction of neo-colonial hierarchy between Poland and Germany, a 
hierarchy that is facilitated by the expansion of the EU and its governing policies and 
institutions, even as the ostensible goal is to overcome these divisions.   
However, one German I spoke with complicated the strict conception of the 
colonized/colonizing binary of Polish/German relations.  Invoking the experience of 
Frankfurt(Oder)’s residents within Germany, he characterized his impression of their attitude 
towards Poles by explaining, “West Germans look down on East Germans, East Germans look 
down on Poles.”  Likewise, several of my respondents observed that Poles also have a superior 
attitude toward Ukrainians.  Oksana, a Ukrainian teaching at a Słubice secondary school, 
described her experience in Poland, “Poles think it is the Promised Land [for Ukrainians]. . . 
There is more money here than in Ukraine for my profession, [but] I’m not looking for a 
Promised Land.”  Introducing additional ethnic and national groups into a binary German/Polish 
hierarchy demonstrates the relationship of Europeanization to the EU’s eastern expansion.  
Wilson emphasizes that “European identity is about both ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ European” Asher 
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(2000:139).  Using this concept, “European-ness” and Europeanization can be represented as a 
continuum between the “non-European” and “European,” with countries located at different 
points along the line depending on how fully they have accepted and internalized the institutions, 
governing practices, and values of the EU.    
In everyday terms, this hierarchy takes the form of differential mobility and access to 
spaces.  While Poles are allowed to travel freely throughout Germany and the EU, they are not 
yet allowed to freely immigrate to Germany or most other EU member states for a “transition” 
period of up to seven years.
16  Similarly, the EU required Poland to reintroduce visas for 
Ukrainians on October 1, 2003, ending the bilateral policy of visa-free travel between the two 
countries
17. However, Poland provides these visas free of charge to Ukrainian citizens, and has 
retained a comparatively liberal policy towards travel from Ukraine, while Germany forbids 
Ukrainians from entering Germany without additional (and difficult to obtain) visas.  For 
Ukrainians living in Słubice, this bars them from the German half of the urban space, returning 
the Słubice  of their experience to its pre-1991 status as an isolated small town rather than an 
integral part of a transnational “Europastadt” (European City).   
Although Polish citizens can now cross the Polish-German border freely, and must be 
treated in the same manner as all EU citizens, the border checkpoints between the two countries 
will remain in place until the EU deems Poland’s eastern border secure, and Poland can 
implement the requirements of the Schengen Convention.  In this way, the border checkpoint in 
Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice acts as a secondary barrier protecting the EU’s core from the potential 
threat of illegal immigration from countries further east (especially Ukraine), and as a regulator 
 
16 In the case of Germany and the fourteen other pre-2004 EU members, a two-year transitional period on 
immigration can be implemented, during which national measures constraining immigration can be applied 
unilaterally by a current member state on a new member state.  These policies will be reviewed after two years, but 
may be applied for up to seven (European Commission 2002:6). 
17 Ukraine has maintained its visa-free policy towards Polish citizens. Asher 
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of population flow that separates internal (EU citizen) from external (non-EU citizen) 
populations.   Because its borders fulfill these roles for the EU, Poland is positioned as a state 
halfway between “European” and “non-European.” The border checkpoint in 
Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is therefore also a regular reminder that Poland and Germany are not yet 
quite equal within the EU, and functions to delineate “ethnically marked class grouping[s]” 
based on asymmetric power relations (Ong 1999:217). 
As Borneman observes, liberty is increasingly measured by the ability to travel 
(1998:173).  I would argue that this is especially true in a globalizing space such as the EU, 
which bases its core principles on the freedom of movement.
18  Therefore, restrictions on the 
freedom of movement in the EU create a hierarchy of social classes that are linked to ethnicity.  
While East Germans might be mapped as second-class Germans, they are still first-class 
“Europeans” enjoying full rights to freedom of movement within the EU.  With their movement 
within the EU qualified for a “transition period,” Poles are currently positioned as second-class 
“Europeans,” but are moving toward first-class status.  With no rights to movement in the EU, 
Ukrainians are positioned as third-class “Europeans” or excluded altogether.  At the EU-wide 
level, Balibar argues that this exclusion of the citizens of non-EU “third countries” is creating an 
underclass of “foreign foreigners” who are “at the service of Europe” and is producing the effect 
of a developing “European apartheid” (2004:44).  
 
 
Identifying Difference in Transnational Spaces 
 
18 Indeed the EU’s four fundamental “freedoms” are the free movement of people, capital, goods, and service. Asher 
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While describing ethnic and national difference and hierarchy in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, 
my respondents also tacitly bring up the important issue of identification.  Borders are a location 
where one can easily adopt or masquerade a different national or ethnic identity, and only during 
the ritual of passing through the border checkpoint must one declare a national citizenship.  If the 
maintenance of ethnic identity is most meaningful at its boundaries (Barth 1969), then it also 
follows that borders are a location where moving fluidly between groups is easiest.  In the North 
Irish village of “Ballybogoin,” Kelleher observes that Catholics and Protestants utilize the 
process of “telling,” a complex practice of reading strangers’ bodies to determine their ethnicity 
(absent of overt phenotypical markers of ethnic difference) and assign them an identity within 
the local space (2003:11-13, 78).  To produce this determination, Ballybogoin residents utilize a 
range of ethnically-mapped criteria including the movements of individuals through local spaces, 
language use, narratives of local history, mode of dress, and local consumption practices 
(2003:11-17, 72-83). Similarly, nearly every resident of Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice with whom I 
spoke insisted to me that they could identify their opposite-side counterparts only by looking.  
Unfortunately, unlike Kelleher’s consultants, none of the people I spoke with were able to 
explicitly describe the criteria they use to make this determination, but the process seemed to 
involve a complex set of national, ethnic, and class markers related to the cross-border practices 
of cultural production and consumption.
19  However, because each of these markers is 
strategically manageable and there are often situations on both sides of the border where it may 
be advantageous for individuals to purposefully use these markers to “blend in” with an ethnic 
group to which they do not belong, the process of “telling” in the transnational space of 
 
19 This is a fruitful topic for additional research on cross-border group formation.  Asher 
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Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is subject to constant negotiation, and therefore seems relatively 
inaccurate and prone to error.  
Nevertheless, in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, language, one of the fundamental markers of 
modern conceptions of nationality (B. Anderson 1983), remains perhaps the most accurate and 
obvious marker of difference and membership in an ethnic group (cf. Kelleher 2003:76-78).  
Language proficiency is also one of the primary gatekeepers for fluidly functioning in the cities’ 
cross-border, transnational, Europeanized space.  One of the first things an outsider notices in 
Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is the constant negotiation of language and the everyday necessity of 
translation for, and the (at least superficial) accommodation of, monolingual “foreigners” from 
across the border.  Language acquisition in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is often a one-way street: 
Poles are expected to learn German, while very few Germans learn more than a few words of 
Polish.  Germans I spoke with repeatedly justified this to me by the argument that Poles can gain 
economically from learning German, while Germans have little to gain from learning Polish.  
Schultz estimates that about 25% of Poles in Słubice have a command of German, while less 
than 5% of Germans in Frankfurt(Oder) have a command of Polish (2002:17).  Similarly, in the 
entire Polish-German border region, only five German Gymnasium offer Polish as part of their 
Abitur exams (Dascher 2003:39).  Many Poles view this lack of interest in the Polish language as 
a further example of German cultural arrogance and neo-colonial attitudes toward Poland. 
The importance of linguistic competence in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, and in the EU 
generally, has made language a consumptive domain.  In Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, language 
classes, tutors, and translators abound, as do “tandem” partnerships, a practice in which two 
people meet regularly to “trade” language skills by teaching one another a different language 
(usually German for Polish or German/Polish for English).  However, at Asher 
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Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice’s cross-border university, German remains the working language of 
classes and students.  Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for conversations to be conducted in two 
or three languages simultaneously, usually in some combination of Polish, German, and English, 
depending on the group’s composition and linguistic abilities (as is often the case at the 
European Commission (Shore 2000:188)).  Students have dubbed the unique combination of 
Polish and German spoken casually at Europa University Viadrina/Collegium Polonicum as 
(from German) Viadrinasprache.  One example of this language is the phrase “na Hof” meaning 
“on the courtyard of the dormitories,” which combines a Polish preposition and a German noun 
(minus the Polish declension).     
Despite the prevalence of multilingualism among the students in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, 
language continues to be an extremely contentious issue for many individuals, and contributes to 
the polarization of social groups.  In social situations at the university, groups tend to fracture 
around language divisions, with Poles speaking Polish and Germans, German—a fact that is 
lamented by some and accepted by others.  Krzysztof, a Polish graduate student, observed that he 
believes language deeply influences attitudes, and that given the countries’ history of conflict, a 
third language is often better for Polish-German relations (usually English).  Krzysztof expresses 
a common opinion among EU elites, who view the ability to speak multiple languages as a way 
for the next generation of transnational “Europeans“--a role the students at Europa University 
Viadrina/Collegium Polonicum are being explicitly educated to fulfill
20--to supersede the ethnic 
and nationalist differences of monolingual individuals.  Nevertheless, Krzysztof also emphasized 
the importance of maintaining an ethno-linguistic identity by criticizing some of his fellow 
students for denying their Polishness and becoming “more German than the Germans” as they 
 
20 The Collegium Polonicum and Europa University Viadrina opened in 1991 with the specific goals of “[bridging] 
the ‘East’ and ‘West,’” “break[ing] barriers and prejudices” between the two nations, and fostering a “common 
European conscience” (Słubice Municipal Government 2003).   Asher 
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move across the border to Frankfurt(Oder).  Karl, German student living in Słubice told me (in a 
mix of German and English) of the double bind he experienced after moving to Poland saying, 
“[In Poland] I talk like normal.  Some people say, ‘you are in a foreign country, you shouldn’t 
speak German,’ but I don’t think it is foreign.  I live here.  Poles say I am kurwa (a whore)
21 for 
it.  Germans say I am kurwa for living here.”  By moving to Poland,  Karl acts contrary to the 
colonized/colonizer positioning of Poland vis-à-vis Germany, and reverses the hierarchal flow of 
individuals from East to West.  Likewise, by refusing to use Polish, he also embodies the 
colonizer arriving from the West to exploit the East. In this manner, Karl is seen as a “whore” by 
both sides, even as he is ostensibly enacting the European principle of free movement between 
nations.   
Therefore, in order to be accepted in a new community, it is often advantageous to 
strategically utilize the markers and characteristics of a different nationality or ethnicity, 
depending on the social situation.  Within the transnational context of the EU, this “situational 
ethnicity” (A. Cohen 1974, R. Cohen 1978), is an especially useful tool for achieving social and 
political gains.  In her analysis of Polish immigrants in Berlin, Morawska observes that one of 
the principal distinctions between immigrant communities is their level of engagement with the 
culture of their new communities (2003).  Contrasting the “trudna polskość” (difficult 
Polishness) of those who fail to assimilate and thus become torn between Poland and Germany 
(or the EU), with the “pragmatic Europeans” who engage with German language and culture, 
Morawska argues that these groups exhibit generational, educational, and class differences, with 
the “Europeans” tending to be younger, better educated, and of a higher socioeconomic class 
(2003:176,179).  Similar distinctions are typical of the processes of Europeanization not only in 
 
21 Literally meaning “a whore,” kurwa is one of the strongest expletives one can use in Polish, and is often used both 
as an adjective and a noun in a similar way as “fucker” in English.   Asher 
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Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, but also across the EU generally,
22 demonstrating the continued 
importance of ethnic and national identifications even within a transnational “European” space.   
 
Conclusions 
In Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, a recurring theme among the cities’ residents is the 
perception that the two cities are collectively undergoing an “identity crisis” as they try to decide 
what it means to be a “Europastadt.”  This is a “crisis” provoked by the EU’s conscious projects 
of deterritorialization and integration, which, through the opening of borders, promote a 
sometimes-uncomfortable confrontation between individuals interacting in everyday domains of 
practice.  By resolving these confrontations, residents of the Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice can enact 
both the identity of the ethnically defined nation-state and the hybridized identity of a 
“European” citizen.  These identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but instead are 
negotiated and contested through the practices and social situations in which they are performed.   
Given the divisive and potentially explosive history of the Polish-German border, a 
history that has been characterized by confrontations and negotiations between asymmetric 
power relations that reinforce ethnic identification and division, the level of integration and 
cross-border contact that has been achieved, despite its many problems and conflicts, is a 
powerful example of the ability of normalizing processes of the EU’s methods of 
governmentality to overcome national differences.  Within Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, the 
deregulation of cross-border movements for people, goods, services and capital mandated by the 
EU has created (at least for EU citizens) a functionally “transnational” space in which 
individuals can circulate freely across national borders.  Indeed, during one three-month period 
 
22 In Poland, these distinctions parallel conceptions of the transition from socialism to capitalism, which frequently 
consider older, less educated, working-class individuals to be less capable of adapting to the market economy  (cf. 
Dunn 1999, 2004, Asher 2003).   Asher 
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when I tracked my own cross-border movements, I crossed over the bridge and through the 
border checkpoint 144 times.  Although many people living in Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice cross the 
border with similar frequency, many cross only rarely, and the average seems to be somewhere 
in-between (cf. Schultz 2002:21).  Other individuals, such as Słubice’s Ukrainian residents and 
other “third-country” residents of both sides of the border, are prohibited from crossing 
altogether, limited by their status as non-EU citizens.  Thus, the border crossing remains a strong 
node of territoriality even amidst the “deterritorialized” space of Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice, and 
the border continues to regulate and demarcate ethnic and national identities, even as its de-
emphasis within the EU enables the formation of hybrid, transnational, “European” identities.   
As a location where what it means to be “European” is negotiated and contested through 
everyday cross-border practices and interactions, I see the transnational space of 
Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice as a microcosm for  transformations that are occurring throughout 
Europe in response to the expansion of the EU’s powers and institutions.  Through the cross-
border consumption practices of its residents, Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice also demonstrates how 
confrontations and articulations between asymmetrical power relations within the EU continue to 
create and reinforce hierarchical, sometimes neo-colonial, relationships, and national and ethnic 
divisions.    
Such relationships are reinforced by a qualitative difference in cities’ appearances, 
especially in the commercial centers, where Frankfurt(Oder) has had the advantage of post-1989 
modernization projects, financed largely by West Germany.  As a result, Frankfurt(Oder) appears 
as less “socialist,“ more affluent, and more “modern,” than Słubice, making it easy for 
Frankfurt(Oder) to project Słubice as “inferior in space and behind in time” (Borneman 
1998:110), a projection that is supported by the EU’s presentation of accession for Poland (and Asher 
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the other Eastern European candidate countries) as choice for democracy and the free market and 
against state-sponsored socialism, and move away from the Soviet Bloc in both temporal and 
spatial terms.   
The EU’s borders are both locations where nationalist and ethnic differences are most 
easily reinforced and where an individual can most easily inhabit the hybrid transnational space 
of the “European.”  As residents of Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice demonstrate new transnational 
identities that complicate and challenge the idea of ethnically and territorially defined nation-
states, their strategic use of ethnicity as they circulate in these territories illustrates the sustained 
importance of nation-states, and the ethno-national identities associated with these nation-states, 
as markers of difference.  Therefore, while the EU’s transnational institutions and governing 
practices create new conduits for expressing identity, they simultaneously reinforce its internal 
differences.  If a hybridized “European” identity is to exist as a long-term continental identity, as 
the EU is pursuing through its policy actions, it must find ways to encompass multiple and 
competing nationalities and ethnicities rather than supersede them, and must develop a 
“tolerance for contradictions, plurality, and the juggling of cultures” (Rosaldo 1989:216).  This 
conception of European identity as in constant flux articulates well with the EU’s self-conception 
as a perpetual “work in progress,” in which “no one waits for Europe to exist, one builds it every 
day” (Abeles 2000:38).  If the EU and the creation of a “European identity” are “works in 
progress,” then Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice is one location where the work is being done,  as are 
scores of locales throughout “Europe,” each of which present not only unique dilemmas and 
challenges for the EU to incorporate, but also variable expressions of what being “European” 
means  (cf. Pagden 2002, Malmbourg & Strath 2002). Asher 
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